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Where the Constitution Falls Short:
Confession Admissibility and Police
Regulation
Courtney E. Lewis*
ABSTRACT
A confession presented at trial is one of the most damning
pieces of evidence against a criminal defendant, which means
that the rules governing its admissibility are critical.  At the out-
set of confession admissibility in the United States, the judiciary
focused on a confession’s truthfulness.  Culminating in the
landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, judicial concern with the reli-
ability of confessions shifted away from whether a confession was
true and towards curtailing unconstitutional police misconduct.
Post-hoc constitutionality review, however, is arguably inappro-
priate.  Such review is inappropriate largely because the review-
ing court must find that the confession was voluntary only by a
preponderance of the evidence, and post-conviction challenges to
admissibility are subject only to harmless error review.
The United States is not the only country that must wrestle
with confession admissibility and police misconduct.  In 1984, the
United Kingdom’s Parliament determined that leaving police
practices unregulated was no longer acceptable and passed the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE).  PACE and its ac-
companying Codes of Practice set out regulations for most police
conduct.  The regulations established clear procedure for police
to follow and the accused to anticipate.
This Comment first examines the history of confession ad-
missibility law as created by the Supreme Court of the United
States.  Next, this Comment considers the British model of con-
fession admissibility.  The British couch confession admissibility
in broader legislation regulating nearly all police practices in de-
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Marissa Lawall for never ceasing to believe in me; and Dr. Christopher Kelly for
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tail.  After consideration of the systems of admissibility in both
the United States and Britain, this Comment argues that post-hoc
constitutionality review of police interrogations is inadequate to
regulate police practices.  Finally, this Comment argues that
American legislative bodies should generate statutory regulation
of police and use the British Police Codes of Practice as a model
for American police regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A confession from a criminal suspect is like striking gold for
police investigators; the police get to close the case, hand it over to
the prosecutor, and return to an overwhelming caseload.  Prosecu-
tors also appreciate a confession from a criminal suspect.1  Confes-
sions usually mean reaching a plea agreement, or if the accused
chooses to go to trial, confessions are extremely weighty in the
courtroom with jurors.2  Even when a defendant recants the confes-
sion, statistics show that juries remain fixated on the original con-
fession and choose to convict, regardless of how scant the other
evidence against the defendant is or how strong the evidence in the
defendant’s favor is.3  In fact, the Innocence Project reports that
over 25 percent of DNA exonerations occur in cases involving a
confession or incriminating statement made by the defendant.4
While the truth about the power of confessions at trial is known,5
the judicially created standards for confession admissibility at crimi-
nal trials are minimal.6
This Comment attempts to expose the inadequacy of the cur-
rent Supreme Court precedents to regulate confession admissibility
at criminal trials.  A discussion of relevant Supreme Court holdings,
centering on the seminal Miranda v. Arizona7 decision, demon-
strates that after-the-fact constitutionality review of police interro-
gation methodologies is an insufficient tool to address the harms of
police misconduct and the highly prejudicial nature of a wrongly
admitted confession.  Further, this Comment suggests that legisla-
tively generated policing regulation would be a useful measuring
stick for police conduct, especially when obtaining incriminating
statements, and for the prosecution in determining when to offer
such statements at trial.  Recognizing that generating police regula-
tions is a herculean task, this Comment briefly analyzes British law
that regulates police and proposes using it as a model for American
police regulations.  This Comment does not intend to argue that the
1. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 221, 221 (1997) [hereinafter Kassin, Confession Evidence].
2. Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
431, 434 (2012) [hereinafter Kassin, Innocence].
3. Id.
4. False Confessions or Admissions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://bit.ly/
2wVm4Ci [https://perma.cc/2DW4-72MX].
5. Kelsy S. Henderson & Lora M. Levett, Can Expert Testimony Sensitize Ju-
rors to Variations in Confession Evidence?, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 638, 638
(2016) (citing several psychological studies on the effects of confession evidence at
criminal trials).
6. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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United States should adopt a word-for-word or policy-for-policy
regulation of police from Britain.  This Comment does, however,
argue that the British model provides an example of how a quasi-
common-law, quasi-statutory system of criminal justice can in fact
regulate police in a way that helps to eliminate secrecy and protect
civil liberties.
II. BACKGROUND
A criminal defendant’s8 confession is arguably the most power-
ful piece of evidence that the prosecution can offer at trial against a
defendant.9  Both judges and juries tend to attribute more eviden-
tiary weight to a defendant’s confession than any other combination
of evidence.10  Even when juries learn that the defendant recanted
the confession,11 or the confession was the product of coercion,12 or
the defendant has a mental illness,13 or that a police informant with
incentives to falsely implicate the accused is the vehicle for the de-
fendant’s confession,14 juries tend to remain fixated on the original
confession.15  The many wrongful conviction cases that include a
false confession demonstrate that false confessions will result in
8. Significant research and scholarship exposes the racial hierarchy embedded
in the American criminal legal system; unfortunately, examination of the intersec-
tion between race, policing, and confession prejudice is beyond the scope of this
Comment.  For more on these topics, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW (2010); Mikah K. Thompson, A Culture of Silence: Exploring the Impact of
the Historically Contentious Relationship Between African-Americans and the Po-
lice, 85 UMKC L. REV. 697 (2017); Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discre-
tion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157 (2013).
9. Kassin, Confession Evidence, supra note 1, at 221 (“In criminal law, confes-
sion evidence is a prosecutor’s most potent weapon—so potent that, in the words
of one legal scholar, ‘the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a
trial in court superfluous.’” (quoting CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)).
10. Kassin, Innocence, supra note 2, at 434.
11. Id. at 433.
12. Id. at 434 (citing Allison D. Redlich et al., Perceptions of Children During
a Police Interview: A Comparison of Alleged Victims and Suspects, 38 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 705 (2008); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions
and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the Harmless Error Rule, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions
and Mock Juror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1980)).
13. Id. (citing Linda A. Henkel, Jurors’ Reactions to Recanted Confessions:
Do the Defendant’s Personal and Dispositional Characteristics Play a Role?, 14
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 565, 565–78 (2008)).
14. Id. (citing Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses
and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137
(2008)).
15. Id.; see also Kassin, Confession Evidence, supra note 1, at 229 (observing
in a discussion on the ability of juries to discount coerced confessions that the
presence of “confessions raised the conviction rate more than do eyewitness identi-
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conviction, regardless of how scant the other evidence is against the
defendant or how strong the evidence is in the defendant’s favor.16
As one confession psychologist observed, “confession evidence is so
inherently prejudicial that people do not fully discount the informa-
tion even when it is logically and legally appropriate to do so.”17
One might assume, given the highly prejudicial nature of con-
fessions at trial, that confession admissibility standards are high and
that interrogation practices by law enforcement are subject to strict
regulation.  However, the judicial system determines admissibility
of a confession only through post-interrogation constitutionality
standards,18 and very little is known about police interrogation
practices.19  Legislatures and executive agencies have not provided
policing best-practices or regulations.20  The absence of guidelines
leaves policing practices, such as interrogations, outside the scope
of democratic governance.21  No one outside the police department
typically reviews police policies and actions regarding interroga-
tions until a defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession,
which prompts a constitutionality review in court.22  Under a consti-
tutionality analysis, judicial review of police practices is more con-
cerned with police misconduct than the reliability of any evidence
proffered—or actually finding the truth.23
fications and character testimony—two other common and potent forms of
evidence”).
16. Kassin, Innocence, supra note 2, at 436.
17. Kassin, Confession Evidence, supra note 1, at 229.
18. In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states, “[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The
Supreme Court recognized the long-held legal standard that confessions must be
made “voluntarily” and only if constitutional rights are made known and the sus-
pect makes an informed waiver of those rights. See infra Part II.A.
19. A handful of police departments, such as the Chicago, Seattle, and Los
Angeles police agencies, have published policing manuals.  Barry Friedman & Ma-
ria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848 n.95 (2015).
20. Id. at 1843.
21. See generally id. (examining the lack of democratic process in regulating
policing practices in the United States).
22. Id. at 1847, 1865; Mark Berger, The Exclusionary Rule and Confession
Evidence: Some Perspectives on Evolving Practices and Policies in the United States
and England and Wales, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 63, 79 (1991) [hereinafter Berger,
Exclusionary Rule]; Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1865.
23. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (reasoning that the explicit
purpose of the evidence exclusionary rule is deterring police misconduct); see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citing United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974)) (reasoning that exclusionary rules are a “‘judicially cre-
ated remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect’”); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (refusing to raise the
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In the event that the prosecution offers an involuntarily given
confession at trial, judges face a difficult dilemma.  They may
choose to either refuse the confession’s admission, thus depriving
the jury of potentially highly probative information, or admit it and
possibly condone police misconduct.24
The United States is not the only country that must overcome
problems associated with confession admissibility.  Through re-
forms made by Parliament over the last half-century, Britain’s sys-
tem is “generally regarded as meticulous in safeguarding the rights
of the accused.”25  Analyzing the British system to inform the
American system is proper because both systems are accusatorial26
and both give the accused a similar right to remain silent.27  Given
that the colonies based the early American system of justice on the
British system, comparing how the two systems have developed
over time is appropriate and valuable.28
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the differences
between the American and British systems of law creation and judi-
cial enforcement.  The American judicial system centers on the pre-
mise that the Constitution is the highest law of the land, and laws
generated by legislatures are always subject to constitutionality re-
view.29  On the other hand, British courts do not have a constitution
standard of proof for the voluntariness of confessions to beyond a reasonable
doubt, in part because “the exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring
lawless conduct by police and prosecution and it is very doubtful that escalating
the prosecution’s burden of proof . . . would be sufficiently productive in this re-
spect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries”);
cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 311 (1991) (explaining why applying the
harmless error standard to erroneously admitted confessions does not offend an
interest in curbing police misconduct).
24. Berger, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 22, at 64.
25. Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7
(1986). But see id. at 7 n.19 (acknowledging other scholars in disagreement with
this proposition).
26. “[A]n accusatorial process [is one] in which the parties, rather than the
judge, have the primary responsibility for marshaling and presenting the evidence,
and in which the fact-finder is an all-lay jury.” Id. at 7.
27. Id.  There are important differences, however. See infra Part II.B.
28. Cf. Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical
View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 314–20 (1998) (discussing early origins of modern
confession law).  The Supreme Court is known to cite to and compare American
criminal justice practices to Great Britain’s practices as well. See Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 n.15 (1940).
29. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  The Supreme Court entertained and
ultimately rejected the argument that a law governing steam boat licensing in New
York, which conflicted with a law passed by Congress, was nonetheless valid for
the state of New York. Id. at 189–92.  The Court reasoned that there are no words
in the Constitution limiting Congress’s authority “to make all laws which shall be
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to interpret as the country’s highest order of law.30  Britain operates
under a parliamentary system where Parliament legislates with sov-
ereignty and the courts must follow that legislation.31
This section offers an examination of the American and British
confession admissibility standards.  First, the section presents a his-
torical review of the United States’ confession admissibility stan-
dards set by the Supreme Court.  Next, the section discusses the
British model of statutory confession admissibility standards em-
bedded in larger sets of Codes of Practice regulating police conduct.
A. The American Legal Standard for the Admissibility of
Confessions
The evolution of confession admissibility in America has been
complicated and slow.32  At colonial inception, the British Crown
bestowed judicial power in America on governors of colonies.33
The Crown quickly left the colonies to their own devices to con-
struct a system of justice.34  The colonists had few other examples
and thus modeled their courts after the British court system.35  Pro-
cedures in both England and colonial America required question-
ing of the accused before trial,36 and confessions were admissible
regardless of how the state obtained them.37  The first British38
necessary and proper” in the execution of their enumerated powers. Id. at 188.
Adopting the principle that the framers used words in the construction of the Con-
stitution intentionally, the Court held that the powers expressly conferred to Con-
gress by the Constitution have supremacy over state legislation conflicting with
those powers. Id. at 189–92.
30. Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British Style: A Decade of Expe-
rience with Adverse Inferences from Silence, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243,
246 (2000) [hereinafter Berger, Reforming Confession Law].
31. Id.
32. Penney, supra note 28, at 310.
33. Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 253, 253 (1967).
34. Id.  For example, Governor Thomas Olive of West Jersey “was in the
habit of dispensing justice sitting on a stump in his meadow.” Id. at 258.
35. Id. at 254.  Although the courts were modeled after the British system,
historians have exposed that colonial courts left much to be desired and often
failed at rendering justice in a meaningful way. Id. at 255.  Complaints about the
inadequacy of the court system were rampant, and around the year 1700, several
colonies sent requests to the British government for chief justices to be sent from
England; however, it appears the Crown never took these ideas seriously. Id. at
259–60.
36. Penney, supra note 28, at 318.
37. Id. at 320.
38. The first American Supreme Court decision addressing confession admis-
sibility did not occur until over 120 years later. See Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897).
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cases addressing confession admissibility are King v. Rudd39 and
King v. Warickshall.40  In Rudd, the court observed that when the
accused gives a confession after threats or promises, “such examina-
tions and confessions have not been made use of against them on
their trial.”41  Eight years later, the Warickshall court affirmed
Rudd into solidified law:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible,
under a consideration whether they are or are not [e]ntitled to
credit.  A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the high-
est credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense
of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to
which it refers; but a confession forced from the mind by the flat-
tery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a
shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.42
The Warickshall court was the first court to clearly reject a con-
fession’s admission based on how the government obtained it.43
Warickshall is the foundation upon which American jurisprudence
built the voluntariness standard of confession admissibility.44
1. Confession Admissibility Pre-Miranda: Voluntariness Standard
Police forces had little power and virtually no responsibility for
gathering evidence against the accused until the mid- to late-
1800s.45  Instead of police, a justice of the peace interrogated the
accused, and whatever the accused said to the justice of the peace
was admissible against the accused.46  The Framers of the United
States Constitution did not believe adding the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution would create tension between the Bill of Rights
and the criminal procedure that was in place.47  Nothing required
39. King v. Rudd (1775) 168 Eng. Rep. 160; 1 Leach 115; see Mark Berger,
Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: A Statutory Approach to Police Inter-
rogations, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 8 (1990) [hereinafter Berger, Legislating
Confession Law] (identifying Rudd and Warickshall as the first English cases that
address confession admissibility).
40. King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234; 1 Leach 262.  However, the
rule espoused in Warickshall and Rudd did not appear in a vacuum; the idea of
voluntariness has origins dating as far back as Medieval romano-canon and civil
law.  Penney, supra note 28, at 320 n.58.
41. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. at 161.
42. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234–35 (footnote omitted).
43. Penney, supra note 28, at 321.
44. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 8.
45. Penney, supra note 28, at 322.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Id. at 319.
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interrogators at the time to inform defendants of any rights they
had, nor were there any limitations on confession admissibility at
trial.48  Rather, the prevailing understanding of the privilege against
self-incrimination was that it prohibited a tyrannical government
from using a confession in court obtained through torture or other
coercive interrogation practices involving threats and promises.49
As defense attorneys became more common in the criminal
process in the 1800s, they began asserting the right to silence for
their clients that the accused may assert today.50  Around the same
time, American cities were following the example of a London
magistrate who employed a group of police officers to act as guards
and assist in investigations.51  As defendants began asserting a right
to remain silent in court, police forces began obtaining confessions
as part of their investigations.52  Courts entered uncharted legal ter-
ritory when defendants challenged the admissibility of confessions
obtained by police.53
a. Voluntariness: The Confession’s Evidentiary Reliability
The first Supreme Court decision in America that held a con-
fession obtained by police inadmissible through the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination was Bram v. United States.54
The Court in Bram relied on the circumstances around the confes-
sion to determine its voluntariness, reasoning that an admissible
confession cannot be “‘obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’”55
While the Bram Court did not provide a definition for “improper
influence,” the majority opinion introduced a two-factor test for
voluntariness:  (1) whether the accused may have feared the conse-
quences of remaining silent, and (2) whether the atmosphere of the
questioning was coercive.56
In Harrold v. Oklahoma,57 the Eighth Circuit stipulated that
confessions of guilt or facts lending to guilt obtained through com-
pulsion, promise, or other inducement are “incompetent evidence
48. Id. at 318.
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id. at 322.
53. Id. at 324.
54. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
55. Id. at 542–43 (quoting 3 RUSSEL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. 1850).
56. Penney, supra note 28, at 328.
57. Harrold v. Oklahoma, 169 F. 47 (8th Cir. 1909).
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against [the defendant] because it is not worthy of belief,”58 and
that “no one person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.’”59  The court reasoned that confessions
obtained through “promises of favor or threats of injury, are ex-
cluded as incompetent . . . not because any wrong is done to the
accused in using them,” but because the statements may not actu-
ally be true and do not have a “legitimate tendency to prove the
facts admitted.”60  Enforcing a rule excluding involuntary confes-
sions was “in the interest of safe and reliable evidence,” not be-
cause the method in which the police obtained the confession was
unconstitutional.61  The court stated that the improperly acquired
confession was incompetent evidence, so admitting the confession
as impeachment was a violation of evidence laws and contravened
the very purpose of evidence rules.62
In Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,63 the Supreme Court
found a confession inadmissible because the circumstances of the
confession rendered it involuntary and unreliable.64  The defendant
in Wan, a 24- or 25-year-old Chinese immigrant, was bedridden
with the Spanish influenza when the police took him for question-
ing about the death of three other Chinese immigrants.65  After 12
days of incessant questioning without counsel or communication
with anyone other than police and detectives, a very ill and emaci-
ated Wan signed a confession that the court allowed the state to
58. Id. at 48 (citing 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 822 (1st ed. 1904)).
59. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
60. Id. at 49 (quoting Commonwealth v. Morey, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 461, 463
(Mass. 1854)).
61. Id. (quoting State v. Novak, 79 N.W. 465, 469 (Iowa 1899)).
62. Id. at 51 (“Involuntary confessions of accused persons are inadmissible to
impeach them as witnesses on the same ground that hearsay and all other incom-
petent evidence is inadmissible to impeach other witnesses, because they are un-
worthy of belief.”).
63. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
64. Id. at 14–15, 17.
65. Id. at 9–10.  When the police officers requested that Wan come with them
for questioning, Wan told them that he was too ill. Id. Once Wan learned that he
and his friend were suspected of murder, he agreed to go with the police. Id.
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enter against him at trial.66  Wan was sentenced to death by
hanging.67
In reaching its decision to overturn Wan’s conviction, the
Court relied heavily on the jail’s chief medical examiner’s testi-
mony.68  The chief medical examiner, who examined Wan on Wan’s
13th day of detainment, testified that Wan was in such a state at the
time that someone in his condition would have likely done “any-
thing to have the torture stopped.”69  The Supreme Court, unlike
the lower courts, did not find such circumstances around a confes-
sion sufficient to ensure that the confession was voluntary and relia-
ble.70 Wan solidified the suggestion in Bram that “circumstances of
detention and interrogation can in themselves create an atmosphere
of compulsion, even in the absence of a specific inducement to
confess.”71
b. Transitioning to Judicial Concern Over Police Misconduct
Forty years after Bram, the Supreme Court confronted confes-
sions obtained through physical torture in Brown v. Mississippi.72
There was no dispute concerning the violent and racially charged
facts73 surrounding the confessions.74  An angry mob of white men
and police beat, repeatedly noosed, and whipped the three black
defendants until the defendants confessed to the exact details that
66. Id. at 10–13.  The facts of Wan’s detention and interrogation were undis-
puted and based on the testimony of the police and chief medical examiner of the
jail. Id. at 9.  The police held Wan incommunicado for the 12 days of questioning
without formal arrest; moreover, a police officer or detective always accompanied
him and “subjected [Wan] to persistent, lengthy and repeated cross-examination.”
Id. at 11.  In the evening of the eighth day, Wan was taken to the location of the
murders and “continuously for ten hours, this sick man was led from floor to floor
minutely to examine and reexamine the scene of the triple murder and every ob-
ject connected with it, to give explanations, and to answer questions.” Id.
67. Id. at 9.
68. See id. at 13–14.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id.
71. Penney, supra note 28, at 329.
72. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
73. The three defendants, whom the lower court characterized as “ignorant
negroes,” were accused of murdering a presumably, given the facts, white man.  Id.
at 281.  The sheriff took one of the defendants, whose name was Ellington, from
his home at night to the home of the victim, where a crowd of white men accused
Ellington of murdering the victim. Id.
74. Id. at 281, 284–85.  The deputy even testified in reference to the severity
of the whipping he did to Ellington:  “‘Not too much for a negro; not as much as I
would have done if it were left to me.’” Id. at 284.  No one who testified denied
the beatings. Id. at 285.
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their accusers demanded.75  The court allowed the confessions into
trial as the only evidence against the defendants.76  Five days later,
a jury found all three defendants guilty of murder, the markings of
the beatings that extracted the confessions still evident on the de-
fendants’ bodies while they sat in court.77  The Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld the convictions.78
The undisputed facts of the case clearly indicated that the con-
fessions were inadmissible under Bram and Wan.79  However, since
Brown was a state case, the Court could not rely on federal com-
mon law to find the confessions inadmissible.80  It also could not
rely on the Fifth Amendment because the Court at this time had
not found the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Bill of Rights to
the states.81  Instead, the Court held that confessions obtained
through physical torture are inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.82
Confessions obtained through physical torture are inadmissible
because “the due process clause requires ‘that state action, whether
through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions.’”83  While the Court did not de-
fine or give examples of what state actions “consistent with the fun-
75. Id. at 281–82.  When Ellington denied responsibility for the murder, the
group of white men, with the help of the deputy, tied a noose around his neck,
repeatedly hung him from a tree, and tied him to the tree and whipped him as he
maintained his innocence. Id. at 281.  When these tactics failed to provoke the
confession they sought, the men allowed Ellington to go home for the night. Id.  A
day or two later, the deputy arrested Ellington at his home and, on the way to the
jail, “severely whipped the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whip-
ping until he confessed.” Id. at 281–82.  Ellington finally promised to confess to
whatever the deputy wanted and made the confession official once they arrived at
the jail. Brown, 297 U.S. at 282.
The same deputy arrested the other two defendants, Brown and Shields, and
brought them to the same jail that housed Ellington. Id. A mob consisting of the
deputy, another officer, the jailer, and other white men came to the jail and forced
Brown and Shields to strip and lay over chairs. Id.  The mob of white men then
“cut [Brown and Shields’ backs] to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it,”
and informed the prisoners that the beatings would not stop until they “confessed
in every matter of detail as demanded by those present.” Id. The beatings contin-
ued and repeated until Brown and Shields adjusted their confessions to match the
demands of the mob. Id.
76. Id. at 284.
77. Id. at 284.
78. Id. at 280.
79. Penney, supra note 28, at 333.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
83. Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
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damental principles of liberty and justice”84 are, the Brown decision
marks a shift away from an interest in a confession’s reliability to-
wards a concern with the process of obtaining confessions.85
Four years after Brown, the Supreme Court took up Chambers
v. Florida.86  Following the robbery and murder of an elderly white
man, the police arrested, without warrant, and jailed some 25 to 40
black men.87  Among those arrested and questioned were the four
black men who appealed the state’s use of their confessions to con-
vict them.88  At the end of a week of questioning, the police ques-
tioned the defendants again from afternoon until sunrise, and the
men finally confessed to facts satisfactory to the state attorney.89
The Court recounted a significant amount of facts and testimony to
show that the circumstances surrounding the confessions may not
have included physical coercion, but had psychological elements of
coercion.90
The Supreme Court refused to approve of the psychological
coercion employed in the Chambers facts, even without the physical
brutality that the facts in Brown presented.91  In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court could have easily reinforced the importance of evi-
dentiary reliability and truthfulness that the Court emphasized in
Bram and Wan, but the Court instead focused on the constitutional-
ity of police conduct.92  The Court reasoned that the Framers in-
84. Id.  The Court did not take the opportunity to define what the “funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice” are in either Herbert or Brown. See gener-
ally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312
(1926).
85. Penney, supra note 28, at 334 n.134 (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Are Con-
fessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1826, 1832 (1987)).
86. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
87. Id. at 229.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 235.
90. See id. at 229–35 n.7.  Each man was questioned individually “surrounded
in a fourth floor jail room by four to ten men, the county sheriff, his deputies, a
convict guard, and other white officers and citizens of the community.” Id. at 231.
One of the officers testified to having “‘broke’” the defendants when referring to
finally obtaining the satisfactory confessions, suggesting a level of coercion. Id. at
231–32.  Further, “from arrest until sentenced to death, petitioners were never—
either in jail or in court—wholly removed from the constant observation, influ-
ence, custody[,] and control of those whose persistent pressure brought about the
sunrise confessions.” Id. at 235.
91. Id. at 239 (“Just as our decision in Brown v. Mississippi was based upon
the fact that the confessions were the result of compulsion, so in the present case,
the admitted practices were such as to justify the statement that ‘The undisputed
facts showed that compulsion was applied.’” (quoting Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1, 16 (1924))).
92. Penney, supra note 28, at 337.
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tended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “to
protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of crime by
those holding positions of power and authority.”93  The Court
found that “[t]o permit human lives to be forfeited upon confes-
sions [which are] obtained [through coercion] would make of the
constitutional requirement of due process of law a meaningless
symbol.”94  The Court made no mention of whether the confessions
were reliable, but focused its attention on the conduct of interrogat-
ing police officers.95
Around 20 years later in Payne v. Arkansas96 and Blackburn v.
Alabama,97 the Supreme Court reversed the respective defendants’
convictions after finding that the police psychologically coerced the
confessions admitted at trial.98  Both opinions are rife with lan-
guage condemning the use of psychologically coerced confessions to
obtain convictions.99  In Blackburn, the Court stated that “coercion
can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused
93. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 236.
94. Id. at 240.
95. See id. at 240 (rejecting “the argument that law enforcement methods such
as those under review are necessary to uphold our laws”); see also id. at 240 n.15
(observing that “police practices here examined are to some degree widespread
throughout our country”).
96. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
97. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
98. Payne, 356 U.S. at 568; Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 211.  In Payne, the interro-
gating officer said that he would not protect the defendant, whom the court termed
“a 19-year-old Negro with a fifth-grade education” who was “mentally dull and
‘slow to learn,’” from an angry mob if the defendant refused to confess. Payne,
356 U.S. at 562, 562 n.4.  In Blackburn, the defendant, Jesse Blackburn, was “a 24-
year-old Negro, [who] had suffered a lengthy siege of mental illness.” Blackburn,
361 U.S. at 200.  Before confessing, Blackburn was interrogated in a closely con-
fined room by as many as three officers at a time for eight or nine hours. Id. at
204.
99. See, e.g., Payne, 356 U.S. at 561 (“The use in a state criminal trial of a
defendants confession obtained by coercion—whether physical or mental—is for-
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206–07 (“[I]n
cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt atti-
tude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of
the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of
an accused against his will.”).  In Payne, the Court stated:
It seems obvious from the totality of this course of conduct, and particu-
larly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the confession was co-
erced and did not constitute an ‘expression of free choice,’ and that its
use before the jury, over petitioner’s objection, deprived him of ‘that fun-
damental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,’ and, hence,
denied him due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Payne, 356 U.S. at 567 (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 237, 240 (1941)) (citations omitted).
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is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”100  In
Payne, the Court recognized that whether “petitioner was not phys-
ically tortured affords no answer to the question whether the con-
fession was coerced, for ‘there is torture of mind as well as body;
the will is as much affected by fear as by force.’”101  The Court ad-
ded in Blackburn that “the efficiency of the rack and the thumb-
screw can be matched, given the proper subject, by more
sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion.’”102  Significantly, however, the
Court made no mention in either Payne or Blackburn about the
importance of truthful and factual evidence.103  Instead, the focus
centered on police behavior.104
Both Payne and Blackburn require, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, reversal of convictions where the state used a psycho-
logically coerced confession to obtain the conviction—regardless of
how overwhelming the rest of the evidence against the accused.105
The Court explained in Payne that “[t]he use in a state criminal trial
of a  defendant’s confession obtained by coercion—whether physi-
cal or mental—is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”106
The Court’s refusal to permit a conviction to stand even if there is
enough evidence to otherwise convict further supports the observa-
tion that the Court became preoccupied with police conduct over
confession reliability.107
To summarize, the evolution of confession admissibility before
the seminal case Miranda v. Arizona108 culminated in whether the
100. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206.
101. Payne, 356 U.S. at 566 (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52–53
(1949)).
102. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206.
103. See generally Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne v. Ar-
kansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
104. Payne, 356 U.S. at 567 (“It seems obvious from the totality of this course
of conduct, and particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the con-
fession was coerced and did not constitute an ‘expression of free choice’ . . . .”);
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206–07 (“Thus, in cases involving involuntary confessions,
this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human
values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing
a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.”).
105. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206 (“[W]e have rejected the argument that intro-
duction of an involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence estab-
lishes guilt or corroborates the confession.”) (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
106. Payne, 356 U.S. at 561.
107. Penney, supra note 28, at 341–46; see also Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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accused voluntarily gave the confession.109  A confession could not
have been voluntary if the state coerced, either physically110 or psy-
chologically,111 the accused into giving the confession.  Whether the
confession was involuntary because of either physical or psychologi-
cal coercion requires the presiding court112 to base its determina-
tion on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
confession.113  The Supreme Court required the exclusion of co-
erced confessions from trial and the reversal of convictions based in
whole or in part on involuntary confessions.114  However, criticism
of the voluntariness standard as “vague, contradictory, and politi-
cally malleable” grew over time.115
2. The New American Standard: Confession Admissibility and
Miranda
The Supreme Court again took up the issue of confession ad-
missibility in the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona.116  The Court,
focused still on police conduct, took the opportunity to provide an
in-depth analysis of the available knowledge about police interroga-
tion practices.117  At the outset of the examination of the police
practices, the Court recognized that “the modern practice of in-cus-
tody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented.”118
109. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
110. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
111. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne, 356 U.S. 560.
112. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).  In Jackson, the Court held that
New York’s procedure for determining whether the police coerced a confession
was unconstitutional. Id. at 391.  The New York rule required that the presiding
judge make a preliminary determination as to whether “in no circumstances could
the confession be deemed voluntary.” Id. at 377.  If there was any uncertainty of
the confession’s voluntariness, the law required the judge to let the jury make a
determination as to its voluntariness as part of the jury’s ultimate determination of
guilt or innocence. Id.  The Court found this practice to be a violation of the ac-
cused’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because when the jury deter-
mines whether the confession was coerced, the accused is denied “a reliable and
clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolu-
tion of disputed facts upon which the voluntariness issue may depend.” Id. at 391.
113. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
114. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376.
115. Penney, supra note 28, at 361.
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
117. See id. at 448–65.
118. Id. at 448.
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The Court, relying heavily on interrogation manuals,119 paints
the picture of what we expect most modern interrogations to look
like.120  The interrogators separate the accused from family or any-
one familiar so that the interrogators can have as much advantage
over the suspect as possible.121  The interrogating police officers
employ tactics “designed to put the subject in a psychological state
where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to
know already—that he is guilty.”122  The police are even en-
couraged to “resort to deceptive stratagems,” such as giving false
legal advice.123  Additionally, the police can fabricate evidence al-
leged against the accused, such as an eyewitness or DNA evidence
that would put the accused at the scene of the crime.124  The manu-
als even provided police with strategies to overcome a suspect as-
serting a right to remain silent or right to counsel, suggesting that
the officers play the part of a concerned friend who simply wants to
help the suspect before anything is official.125
Against the backdrop described in the interrogation manuals,
the Court asserted that these techniques carry their “own badge of
intimidation . . . . not physical intimidation, but it is equally destruc-
tive of human dignity.”126  With no available remedy outside the
Constitution and case precedent,127 the Court moves into a discus-
sion of what an acceptable confession looks like under available
119. CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
(Thomas Springfield, III., ed. 1956); FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (Williams & Wilkin, Co. 1962).
120. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449–55. But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (“The materials [the majority] refers to as ‘police manuals’ are . . .
merely writings in this field by professors and some police officers.  Not one is
shown by the record here to be the official manual of any police department, much
less in universal use in crime detection.”).
121. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 455.
124. Id. at 453.
125. Id. at 453–55 (citing O’HARA and INBAU & REID, supra note 119).  Since
the Miranda decision came down, these manuals published new editions to comply
with Miranda. See, e.g., CHARLES E. O’HARA & GREGORY L. O’HARA, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (7th ed. 2003); FRED. E. INBAU ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed. 2013).
126. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
127. See id. at 459.  The Court reasoned, immediately after the multipage dis-
cussion of the police interrogation practices, that
[t]hose who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever
aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty.  They knew that “il-
legitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by si-
lent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.”
Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
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law.128  Amidst a review of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the voluntariness standard,129 as well as
some of the practices in other countries,130 the Court held that cer-
tain information must be given to individuals in police custody, or
“otherwise deprived of [their] freedom by the authorities in any sig-
nificant way,”131 before the state may use anything they say against
them in court.132
The information that police must give to a suspect before ques-
tioning is what people today refer to as a person’s “Miranda
Rights.”  Under Miranda, the police must inform the suspect that
“he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning.”133  The accused may
waive these rights, but the prosecution bears the burden of proving
that the accused made “a knowing and intelligent waiver” of these
rights.134  Otherwise, the state cannot use any statement made as a
result of interrogation against him.135
The dissenting justices in Miranda had significant concerns
about the impact that the majority holding would have on law en-
forcement.136  The dissenters argued that the new warnings re-
quired by the court would all but kill police ability to conduct
investigations.137  They advocated for maintenance of the standard
requiring “continuing re-evaluation on the facts of each case of how
much pressure on the suspect was permissible.”138
3. Confession Admissibility Post-Miranda
The “Miranda warning” was the Court’s attempt at simplifying
the voluntariness standard.  Miranda warnings replaced the volun-
128. See generally id. (citing extensive case law interpreting the Constitution).
129. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461–67.
130. Id. at 478–90.  Significantly, one of the countries that the Supreme Court
analyzes in its discussion of confession admissibility internationally is England. Id.
at 487.
131. Id. at 478.  What exactly constitutes “in police custody,” while interest-
ing, is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For opinions regarding what constitutes
“in custody,” see Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Berkemer v. Mc-
Carty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
132. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 498–99.
135. Id. at 479.
136. Id. at 500–45 (dissenting opinions).
137. Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tariness standard with a bright-line guide for police practices and
for courts to determine admissibility.139  Unfortunately, the new re-
quirement that the suspect make a “knowing and intelligent”
waiver of their constitutional rights proved to be just as amorphous
as the voluntariness standard.140  Supreme Court decisions follow-
ing Miranda do not meet the powerful and demanding spirit of Mi-
randa.141  Instead, subsequent Supreme Court decisions on
confession admissibility apply rules that are a combination of requi-
site warnings, waivers, and voluntariness, as shown by a totality of
the circumstances.142
a. The First Step Away: Partial Right Notifications and
Voluntariness by a Preponderance of the Evidence
Frazier v. Cupp143 was one of the first Supreme Court confes-
sion admissibility decisions after Miranda.144  The Supreme Court
found in Frazier that a partial notification of the suspect’s constitu-
tional rights was adequate if the police questioning that led to a
confession was brief.145  As shown in the approximately one hour
and forty-five minute tape-recorded interrogation, the petitioner
was questioned for a time before he was given “a somewhat abbre-
viated description of his constitutional rights.”146  The police in-
formed him that he could have an attorney and that anything he
said could be used against him at trial.147  Once the police gave him
that partial notification of his rights, the questioning became a little
more intense.148  The police told the petitioner that someone the
petitioner said he had been with had already confessed to the
crime—a statement that was not true.149  Once the police lied and
139. Penney, supra note 28, at 366.
140. Id.
141. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules
for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10–23 (2015) (discussing pre-Mi-
randa, Miranda, and post-Miranda).
142. Id. at 22. But see Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at
245 (suggesting “the core of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has remained
largely intact” since Miranda).
143. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
144. The first relevant case decided after Miranda was Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966).  In Johnson, the Court held that both Escobedo and Miranda
were applicable only to cases with trials that began after each of those decisions
were made. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 721.
145. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.  The police arrested the petitioner at about 4:15
PM, took him to headquarters, and questioned him from about 5:00 PM until he
signed a confession at about 6:45 PM. Id. at 737.
146. Id. at 737.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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gave suggestions to the defendant about the crime, the defendant
spilled out a story about the crime and requested an attorney.150
The police, however, stopped the questioning and responded, “you
can’t be in any more trouble than you are in now,” before obtaining
the full written confession.151
The petitioner argued that the court should not have admitted
his confession because it was involuntary.152  In addressing the
claim that the confession was involuntary, the Frazier Court revived
the pre-Miranda “totality of the circumstances” standard to deter-
mine voluntariness.153  The Court reasoned that since “he received
partial warnings of his constitutional rights” and the duration of
questioning before the confession was short, the confession the pe-
titioner gave must have been voluntary.154  The Court permitted the
confession’s admission, notwithstanding the recognition that the po-
lice intentionally lied to him about evidence it did not have in its
possession—namely that the person who the petitioner said he had
been with at the time of the crime had already confessed.155
Even though Miranda’s confession admissibility standards did
not apply to this petitioner’s trial because his trial took place before
the Miranda decision,156 Frazier served to weaken the strong expec-
tations rendered in Miranda.  While the Court attempts to make
clear that the Frazier decision falls under the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” voluntariness rule that existed before Miranda,157 the
language from Miranda creeps into the Frazier holding.158  For ex-
ample, the Frazier Court reasoned that the defendant “was told
that he could have an attorney if he wanted one and that anything
he said could be used against him at trial. . . . [Thus,] he received
150. Id. at 738.
151. Id.
152. Id.  The petitioner in Frazier also argued that his confession was inadmis-
sible under Escobedo and Miranda; however, since the Court reasoned that Esco-
bedo did not apply to his facts and that Miranda was decided after the date of his
trial, this argument failed.  Id.; see also supra, note 144.
153. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
154. Id.
155. Id. (“The fact that the police misrepresented the statements that [the co-
defendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this other-
wise voluntary confession inadmissible.”).
156. Id. at 738; see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding
that states could apply Miranda to cases tried before the Miranda decision if they
wanted to, but they were not required to do so).
157. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
158. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (detailing the warnings police must
give to the accused before questioning), with Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739 (“Before
petitioner made any incriminating statements, he received partial warnings of his
constitutional rights; this of course, a circumstance quite relevant to a finding of
voluntariness.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK206.txt unknown Seq: 21 24-JAN-19 12:56
2019] WHERE THE CONSTITUTION FALLS SHORT 571
partial warnings of his constitutional rights.”159  That reasoning is
remarkably similar to the requirement generated in Miranda that
the defendant “be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, [and] that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney.”160  The muddied conflation of the totality of the circum-
stances standard with the Miranda warnings weakened Miranda’s
potential power to protect the accused.
The Supreme Court continued to chip away at the protections
afforded to the accused when it held in Lego v. Twomey161 that “the
prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence
that the confession was voluntary.”162  In Lego, the petitioner ar-
gued that his confession was involuntary because the police beat
him in the head and neck with the butt of a gun during the interro-
gation.163  The trial court admitted his confession despite a photo he
presented of the injuries.164  Relying on the principles and reason-
ing in landmark cases like Jackson v. Denno,165 Brown v. Missis-
sippi,166 and Miranda, the petitioner argued that the prosecution
must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable
doubt.167  The arguments left the majority unpersuaded, and the
Court reasoned, “we are unconvinced that merely emphasizing the
importance of the values served by exclusionary rules is itself suffi-
cient demonstration that the Constitution also requires admissibil-
ity to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”168
b. Where’s Miranda Now? The Supreme Court Finds Coerced
Confessions Can Be Harmless
Arguably, the Supreme Court took the largest step away from
the spirit of Miranda by its decision in Arizona v. Fulminante.169  A
severely divided court170 found that an erroneous admission of an
159. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 737, 739.
160. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
161. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
162. Id. at 489.
163. Id. at 480.
164. Id. The trial court reasoned that the defendant obtained the injuries in
the photo from a scuffle involved in carrying out the robbery at issue. Id.
165. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); see also supra note 112.
166. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
167. Lego, 404 U.S. at 487–88.
168. Id. at 488. But see id. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
170. Justice White wrote for the five-four majority in Parts I, II, and IV of his
opinion, and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the five-four majority in Part II of
his opinion. Id. Each of the Parts has a different combination of justices joining
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK206.txt unknown Seq: 22 24-JAN-19 12:56
572 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:551
involuntary confession does not automatically overturn a convic-
tion; instead, the violation of the constitutional protection is merely
subject to a harmless-error analysis.171  The Court characterized ad-
mission of a coerced confession as a “classic ‘trial error,’” which it
determined is not a constitutional violation that amounts to the
right to a new trial.172  Subjecting the admission of a coerced con-
fession at trial to a harmless-error analysis means that the appellate
court “simply reviews the remainder of the evidence against the de-
fendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”173  In other words, if the re-
viewing court finds that the state could have obtained the convic-
tion without the confession, considering all other evidence admitted
at trial, the conviction is constitutional.
In Fulminante, the Court not only violated the sanctity of pro-
tecting against involuntarily given confessions embedded in Mi-
randa,174 but it demonstrated a complete about-face on its
abhorrence of unconstitutional police conduct that characterized
Chambers175 and Blackburn.176  The Blackburn Court, for example,
cited several decisions supporting its statement that “we have re-
jected the argument that introduction of an involuntary confession
is immaterial where other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates
the confession.”177  The Fulminante decision is a full-throated rejec-
tion of the idea that admission of a police-coerced confession—re-
gardless of whether physically or psychologically coerced—is so vile
them to provide majority.  Contained in each opinion are dissents, and Justice
Kennedy filed an additional opinion. Id.
171. Id. at 310.
172. Id. at 309.
173. Id. at 310.
174. See Penney, supra note 28, at 371.
175. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1940).  The Court
stated:
From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture
and extortion of confessions of violations of the ‘law of the land’ evolved
the fundamental idea that no man’s life, liberty or property be forfeited
as criminal punishment for violation of that law until there had been a
charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice,
passion, excitement, and tyrannical power. . . . [T]he forfeiture of the lives,
liberties[,] or property of people accused of crime can only follow if pro-
cedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed.
Id. (emphasis added).
176. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
177. Id. at 206 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567–68 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 (1949);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)).
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to the rights in our Constitution that it affords the defendant a new
trial.178
The case law prior and subsequent to Miranda leaves confes-
sion admissibility in a complicated stratagem of checking for the
requisite warning and notification of rights, proof of knowing and
intelligent waiver, and voluntariness.179  Further, concern about a
confession’s reliability and truthfulness seems to have completely
disappeared from the analysis of whether a confession was volun-
tary or admissible.180  The evolution of confession law has produced
a “voluntariness doctrine [that] remains as hazy and unfocused as
ever, . . . almost always arriving at the conclusion that what the
police did was, all things considered, acceptable.”181  The case law,
as it stands, leaves it unclear if there is any hope that a defendant’s
coerced confession has any way of staying out of the earshot of the
jury.182
178. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White pointed
out the Court’s shift, stating,
The majority today abandons what until now the Court has regarded as
the “axiomatic [proposition] that a defendant in a criminal case is de-
prived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in
part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or fal-
sity of the confession, and even though there is ample evidence aside
from the confession to support the conviction.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964)).
179. See infra Part II.A.3; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973) (“In determining whether a defendant’s will was over-borne in a partic-
ular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—
both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”); Das-
sey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The Supreme Court’s many
cases applying the voluntariness test have not distilled the doctrine into a compre-
hensive set of hard rules, though prohibitions on physical coercion are absolute.”),
cert denied, 86 U.S. 3640 (2018).
180. Primus, supra note 141, at 9; Van Kessel, supra note 25, at 26.
181. Primus, supra note 141, at 3; see also Van Kessel, supra note 25, at 27
(“[The Supreme Court] has failed to articulate clear and predictable voluntariness
standards and often has avoided supervising lower courts in their review of claims
that threats or promises were used to procure confessions.”).
182. While involuntary and coerced confessions are inadmissible in the prose-
cution’s case-in-chief, the Supreme Court held in Harris v. New York that a defen-
dant’s coerced confession may be used to impeach him.  401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Considering the documentation about a jury’s inability to disregard a coerced con-
fession once it has heard the confession, concern exists over whether a jury can
differentiate between purposes for which a confession is offered in the courtroom.
Kassin, Innocence, supra note 2, at 434.
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B. The British Legal Standard for the Admissibility of
Confessions
As noted above, the British and American confession admissi-
bility standards began in the same place.183  Similar to the Ameri-
can standard of admissibility, the British standard requires that the
court find that the accused voluntarily made the confession before
the court can allow the prosecution to enter it into evidence.184
However, after a finding by the 1981 Royal Commission on Crimi-
nal Procedure that the “voluntariness” standard was too difficult to
manage in practice, Parliament enacted the Police and Criminal Ev-
idence Act of 1984 (PACE).185  PACE and its accompanying codes
have arguably made policing in England more democratic and con-
fessions that make it into court more reliable.186  But with the legis-
lation has come an evolution of British law that shrinks a
constitutional right Americans hold dear:  the right to remain
silent.187
1. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 and the
Interrogation Code
While the United States has left police interrogation practices
and confession admissibility entirely up to police departments
themselves and reviewable only under constitutionality stan-
dards,188 the United Kingdom has addressed confession admissibil-
ity by codifying police interrogation practices and admission
exclusion rules.189  PACE and the accompanying Codes of Practice
began a comprehensive centralization of control over police con-
183. See, e.g., King v. Rudd (1775) 168 Eng. Rep. 160; 1 Leach 115; King v.
Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234; 1 Leach 262 (cited in Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897)); see also supra Part II.A. (discussing the beginning of
American courts).
184. Van Kessel, supra note 25, at 15.
185. Id. at 20; see Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, c. 60,
(UK).
186. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 78.
187. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 243 (“The principle
that a suspect in a criminal case should not be subjected to compelled self-incrimi-
nation is widely accepted.”).  Additionally, the United Nations International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms support the right against self-incrim-
ination. Id. at 244.
188. See supra Part II.A.3.b.  “Most United States Supreme Court cases sup-
pressing confessions as involuntary have involved rather extreme factual situations
such as police brutality, unconscionable trickery, or a particularly vulnerable sus-
pect.”  Van Kessel, supra note 25, at 24–25.
189. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 5.
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duct, with Parliament producing additional codes over time.190
PACE and the accompanying Interrogation Code191 provide police
officers with thorough and detailed instructions on how to conduct
questioning and when a confession is admissible in court.192  Now,
the most important differences between the American and the Brit-
ish confession admissibility standards are the mandatory and discre-
tionary exclusion rules and the comprehensive detailed codification
of the entire interrogation process.193
Under PACE, judges can exclude confessions from court
through either mandatory exclusion or discretionary exclusion.194
The first mandatory exclusion in PACE applies to any statements
obtained through “oppression” and to any statements that are
likely to be unreliable under the circumstances.195  Section 76(8) de-
fines “oppression” as including “torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not
amounting to torture).”196
Section 76(2)(b) requires the exclusion of confessions that
were or “may have been obtained . . . in consequence of anything
said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the
time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by
him in consequence thereof.”197  The language in section 76(2)(b)
that excludes any confession considered “unreliable” under the cir-
cumstances is arguably broad enough for a barrister to successfully
argue for exclusion of a confession obtained in a questionable man-
ner that does not fit into the section 76(8) “oppression” category.198
The Interrogation Code provides many of the constitutional in-
terrogation rights established in the United States.  The code pro-
vides for the right to counsel,199 right to silence,200 record of waiver
if the accused waives any rights,201 rest periods in questioning,202
190. See PACE, c. 60, (UK).
191. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C Revised: Code of Prac-
tice for the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers
(2018) [hereinafter PACE, Code C].
192. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 5.
193. Id. at 6.
194. See PACE, c. 60, §§ 76(2)(a)–(b), 76(3), 76(8), (UK).
195. See id. § 76(2)(a).
196. Id. § 76(8).
197. Id. § 76(2)(b).
198. Id. §§ 76(2)(a)–(b), 76(3), 76(8); see Berger, Legislating Confession Law,
supra note 39, at 16.
199. PACE, Code C, § 6 (right to legal advice).
200. Id. § 3.2(a)(iv).
201. Id. § 6.5.
202. Id. § 9.
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meals,203 and others rights.204  However, the details of how the
United Kingdom observes these rights are occasionally different
than the United States.
2. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994
Up until the 1970s, the United States and Great Britain ob-
served the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimina-
tion similarly.205  The two systems were similar in practice when
protecting the right to remain silent while in police custody and in
determining confession admissibility on the voluntariness stan-
dard.206  In 1972, however, a group of researchers proposed changes
to British law that protected the right to remain silent without the
jury’s opportunity to draw adverse inferences from that silence.207
Parliament refused to act on the report and its suggested changes to
evidence law amidst overwhelming public disapproval of the propo-
sal.208  The British started the conversation about limiting the right
to silence, however.  The conversation crept into the political fore-
front in 1987 when the Home Secretary gave a speech to the Police
Foundation that questioned whether the good of observing the right
outweighed its harm.209
In 1988, Parliament enacted legislation exclusively applicable
to Northern Irish criminal cases to address ongoing violence in the
region.210  Known as the Criminal Evidence Order, the law permit-
ted finders of fact to draw inferences of guilt from a defendant’s
silence.211  The Order sought to address the sense that suspects
seemed to be exploiting their right to remain silent, and pointing
203. Id. § 8.6.
204. See, e.g., id. § 10(d) (additional rights to children and the mentally dis-
abled); id. § 5 (right not to be held incommunicado); id. § 9.5 (access to medical
attention).
205. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 248.  Results in
application were certainly not always the same; however, “viewed in perspective,
the similarities between American and British self-incrimination doctrine were far
more significant than their differences.” Id. at 249.
206. Carol A. Chase, Hearing the “Sounds of Silence” in Criminal Trials: A
Look at Recent British Law Reforms with an Eye Toward Reforming the American
Criminal Justice System, 44 KAN. L. REV. 929, 930 (1996).
207. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 246, 250.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 253.
210. Id. at 254.
211. Id. at 254–66 (discussing the Northern Ireland Order and subsequent
British adoption of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act); see Criminal Evi-
dence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (UK).
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out the silence to the jury seemed an appropriate way to resolve
it.212
The British subsequently adopted a similar statute after ap-
pointing a committee to generate a report on reforming the right to
silence.213  The Criminal Justice and Public Act of 1994 (“Act”) ex-
tended curtailment of the right to remain silent in Northern Ireland
to England and Wales.214  The Act permitted judges and juries, at
the behest of the prosecution, to draw adverse inferences based on
a person’s choice to remain silent, even to the point of determining
guilt or innocence.215  Factfinders may draw only “proper” infer-
ences,216 yet no legislative instruction exposes what would be a
proper versus improper inference.217  The Act, by purpose and de-
sign, transfers a heavy weight onto the accused to forgo the right to
silence.218  Regardless of whether the accused chooses to answer
police questions or testify, the choice is never free of risk.219
While the idea might surprise most Americans who hold the
right to remain silent nearly and dearly,220 many British people saw
the restriction on the right to remain silent as necessary in a setting
that they perceived to strongly disadvantage prosecutors.221  In the
1970s, there was a growing concern that “experienced criminals”
wielded the right to silence, without the risk of an inference of guilt,
against police and prosecutors.222  In this way, the British system
212. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 254.  The Order did
not permit the accused to be compelled by subpoena to testify and failing to testify
was not a criminal act. Id. at 255.
213. See id. at 257–59.
214. Id. at 263.  “One of the central objectives of the Act was to ease the
burden of proving the defendant’s membership in a proscribed terrorist organiza-
tion.” Id. at 247 n.21.  It is important to note that the United States similarly wres-
tled with terrorist-defendant rights following the 2001 terrorist attacks, but this
issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009).
215. Chase, supra note 206, at 930.
216. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 262 n.81.  The ac-
cused is protected from this curtailment of the right to remain silent only if the
accused is under 14 years of age or suffers a physical or mental condition to render
the accused “undesirable” to testify. Id. at 262.  The judge may refuse to allow
adverse inferences for “good cause.” Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 265.
219. Id.
220. Chase, supra note 206, at 929 (“One of the rights fundamental to the
American criminal justice system is the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.”); Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at
243 (“The principle that a suspect in a criminal case should not be subjected to
compelled self-incrimination is widely accepted.”).
221. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 259.
222. Id. at 246 n.18; Chase, supra note 206, at 938.
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addressed the perception that the right to remain silent and avoid
self-incrimination protected the guilty more than the innocent and
deprived the factfinder from probative information.223
There are some protections built into the rule.  For example,
the prosecution may only suggest inferences of guilt when the ac-
cused exercised their right to remain silent and the accused had ac-
cess to counsel.224  Counsel may also advise the defendant to
remain silent and ask that the court restrict the jury’s adverse infer-
ences based on that silence because counsel instructed the defen-
dant as such.225  However, the judge may inquire why counsel
advised silence and deny the request to restrict adverse inferences
based on whether counsel divulges his reasoning for silence.226  The
process of advising silence can drive a wedge of distrust between
counsel and defendant because such a process could compromise
privilege between the counselor and defendant.227  Occasions where
a British court restricts a jury’s adverse inferences from a defen-
dant’s silence are rare.228
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Reality that the Court Is Inadequate at Regulating
Confession Law and Police Conduct
As described above, the malleable and police-friendly volunta-
riness rule governs American law regarding confession admissibil-
ity.  To meet the voluntariness rule, the prosecution must show that
the confession was voluntary only by the totality of the circum-
stances, by a preponderance of the evidence, subject only to harm-
less error review.229  Without legislation,230 the only way that the
courts can have any oversight over police conduct is through after-
the-fact constitutionality review.231  The judicial system has largely
failed to protect the accused from coerced confessions at the hands
223. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 253.
224. Id. at 264; see also PACE, Code C, supra note 191, Annex C.
225. Berger, Reforming Confession Law, supra note 30, at 287.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 288.
229. Primus, supra note 141, at 3.
230. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1993) (“[L]egislatures have done little
by way of limiting the discretion of police and prosecutors, or requiring the crimi-
nal courts to observe procedural safeguards against unjust conviction.  By default,
the judiciary has become the principal guardian of the rights of the accused.”).
231. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1865.
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of police232 or from prosecutors presenting recanted confessions to
the jury.233
The first issue unresolved by judicial oversight of confession
admissibility is that it has, by all indicators, failed to reign in police
misconduct.234  Miranda was a remarkably ambitious decision, with
an apparent goal of curbing police misconduct.235  However, the ac-
cused waive their Miranda rights more than three-quarters of the
time and render “Miranda’s formalities . . . no more than a prelimi-
nary ritual to the methods the court deplored.”236  Even though
confession rates may have dipped following Miranda, they recov-
ered to pre-Miranda rates quickly.237  After a long analysis, one
scholar succinctly laid out the simple deductive reasoning one must
use to arrive at the conclusion that Miranda and its progeny have
failed to protect the rights of the accused or change police conduct:
If the police obtained confessions unfairly before Miranda and if
Miranda reduced the frequency of their unfair practices, one
would expect a reduction in the number of confessions and prob-
ably in the number of convictions.  It seems unlikely that suspects
who formerly confessed only after being subjected to unfair ques-
tioning responded to Miranda by providing an equal number of
confessions out of the goodness of their hearts.238
The second issue unresolved by judicial oversight of confession
admissibility is a coerced confession’s influence over the jury and
the ultimate revelation of truth.  The exclusionary rule is largely not
working to exclude recanted and potentially coerced confessions.239
Further, appellate review of whether a confession’s entry into the
courtroom was appropriate rarely results in a new trial.240  The Su-
preme Court’s decisions on confession admissibility described
232. Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849,
880 (2017).
233. See supra note 182.
234. Alschuler, supra note 232, at 889–90.
235. See supra Part II.A.2.
236. Alschuler, supra note 232, at 856.
237. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 1.  For an overview
of the entertainment and disproval of scholarly literature claiming that Miranda
significantly negatively impacted police in obtaining confessions, see Alschuler,
supra note 232, at 881–90.
238. Alschuler, supra note 232, at 889–90.
239. Even though the Court stated in Miranda that the prosecution had a
“heavy burden” in proving adequate waiver of rights, the Court found in Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), that the prosecution must only show waiver by a
preponderance of the evidence—a much lower standard than either a “clear and
convincing” or “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Berger, Legislating Confes-
sion Law, supra note 39, at 1 n.3.
240. See supra notes 169–77 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK206.txt unknown Seq: 30 24-JAN-19 12:56
580 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:551
above show that the prosecution is likely to have the accused’s con-
fession admitted at trial in one way or another,241 highly prejudicing
the accused.242  Once that is done, a court is still unlikely to grant a
new trial under the harmless-error doctrine, even if the confession
was involuntary.243
Miranda and the voluntariness doctrine are exemplary of how
the courts are “simply incapable of making the sorts of tradeoffs
that are necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of a deterrence-
based regime.”244  The current legal structure both does nothing to
prevent police misconduct and leaves most victims of police mis-
conduct without remedy,245 often convicted and incarcerated.  The
reality is that “[c]onstitutional regulation of police interrogation is
in a state of collapse.”246
B. Ending Police Exceptionalism: A Democratic Process for
Police Regulation
While the Supreme Court has moved away from the seminal
decision’s spirit, Miranda seemed to recognize that an after-the-fact
constitutionality review of police misconduct may not adequately
address the problems that arise in interrogation.  The majority in
Miranda invited the legislative branch to address the issue, stating:
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect.  We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting
the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement
of our criminal laws.247
Legislators have largely failed to do this.248  To the contrary, in
1968, Congress attempted to legislate over Miranda.249
241. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text.
243. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
244. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1875.
245. Id. at 1865.
246. Primus, supra note 141, at 2.
247. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
248. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1831 (“Compared to the
sprawling administrative codes that detail every aspect of agency practice, laws
governing the police are notably sparse—if they exist at all.”).
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)–(b) (2018), invalidated by Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  Subsections (a) and (b) re-enacted the voluntariness
standard as demonstrated by the totality of the circumstances as the only require-
ment for confession admissibility, effectively nullifying the necessity of Miranda
warnings. Id.
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There are many possible reasons why the police continue to be
the “distinct outlier” when it comes to government agency regula-
tion.250  Discussing the many reasons why the police go unregulated
is beyond the scope of this Comment,251 but noting the legislative
slumber around police practices is necessary here.
While legislatures have authority to regulate police practices so
long as regulations do not infringe on constitutional rights,252 legis-
lators are loathe to legislate changes to police practices and face
criticism for an “easy on crime” stance.253  Additionally, strong in-
terest groups willing to pay for legislation with votes, volunteer
time, or campaign contributions seem to be one of the primary
motivations for legislators.254  In the area of police regulation, one
“interest group” consists of the poor, uneducated, and people of
color, while the opposing group consists of police and prosecu-
tors.255  One need not contemplate long to deduce which of those
interest groups possesses more political currency—and economic
currency.256  Not only is it much easier for legislatures to do nothing
about regulating police, it has historically been in their political and
financial interests to resist such regulation.257  Nonetheless, devel-
oping regulations for police conduct is necessary, timely, and con-
gruent with American values.258
One way to accomplish the goal of regulating police under
democratic review is through a judiciary-led push for legislatures to
250. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1831 (“Of all the agencies
of [the] executive government, those that ‘police’—i.e., that engage in surveillance
and employ force—are the most threatening to the liberties of the American peo-
ple.  Yet, from the standpoint of democratic governance, they are the least
regulated.”).
251. For an extensive discussion about why police exceptionalism exists and
persists, see Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19. See also Dripps, supra note
230 (identifying and discussing public choice theory as why legislatures don’t “give
a damn about the rights of the accused”).
252. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also Berger, Legislating Confession Law,
supra note 39, at 4 n.16.
253. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1863–64.
254. Id. at 1863.
255. Id.
256. Dripps, supra note 230, at 1089.
257. Id. at 1090.  Additionally, legislators likely identify more with victims of
crime than suspects, so where legislation exists, it naturally favors a “tough on
crime” structure. Id. at 1089.
258. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1837 (“Accountability is
primal to American democracy.”); id. at 1843 (“Because the usual requisites of
democratic authorization are lacking with policing, we can have little confidence
that policing at present is efficacious, cost-effective, or consistent with popular
will.”).
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generate regulations over police.259  Under this theory, the courts
should require proof of authorization when adjudicating challenges
to police conduct.260  Requiring prior authorization in the context
of confessions, for example, would mean that the police would have
to defend their reasons for and methods of interrogation based on
either a court order to do so or a regulatory procedure.261  If the
police are unable to demonstrate authorization for the interroga-
tion, the courts would exclude the communication.  Conversely, if
police could demonstrate prior authorization for the communica-
tion with the accused, the courts would give deference to police.262
An approach such as this would likely moot the voluntariness
doctrine.
Regardless of the method employed to spur legislative action,
the United Kingdom’s experience with police regulation is a signifi-
cant resource for the United States.263  While any American regula-
tion over police would inevitably employ different rules,264 the
British experience demonstrates that a statutory approach to police
regulation is possible and effective.265
One of the notes America could take from the British model is
a focus on clear criminal procedure, as opposed to relying on a post
hoc review based on a constitutional floor.266  PACE and the ac-
companying Codes, such as Code C on Interrogations, scrutinize
and delineate police activity as clearly as possible.267
A second note that the United States could take from the Brit-
ish model is the accessibility and transparency of police practices
and procedures.  PACE and all accompanying Codes of Practice are
readily accessible online and easily navigable.268  The ease of access
259. Id. at 1889–1907.  Friedman and Ponomarenko suggest this strategy for
three main reasons:  (1) “Many of the extant statutes that do regulate police are on
the books in response to judicial decisions;” (2) judicial focus on procedural fail-
ures would permit denial of deference to police actions that do not have sufficient
democratic authorization; and (3) existing constitutional doctrines provide room
for “courts to motivate democratically accountable policing.” Id. at 1836.
260. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1835.
261. Cf. id. at 1835 (advocating for courts to exclude confessions if police are
unable to provide authority for obtaining a confession).
262. Cf. id.
263. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 5.
264. It is unlikely and probably unwise, for example, for Americans to give up
their right to be free from negative inferences based on asserting a right to silence.
Chase, supra note 206, at 944.
265. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 6.
266. Id. at 5.
267. Id. at 6.
268. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, (UK), https://bit.ly/
2Fw9T12 [https://perma.cc/C2UG-A4AL].
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presumably means a more informed public, who can anticipate
what contact with police looks like, or should look like.269  As polic-
ing stands in the United States today, mystery envelopes police
practices, and police regularly deny access to their policies, applica-
tion methods, and corresponding data.270  Arguably, focusing on,
and easing access to, police procedure would generate a measuring
stick for lawful police conduct and a more balanced dialogue about
how Americans experience policing.
Of course, the United States should not ascribe to the British
model identically.  There are substantial differences between the
countries that would make such an action imprudent.  Significantly,
parliamentary supremacy is the basis of British law, whereas consti-
tutional supremacy is the basis of American law.271  As a constitu-
tional issue, policing is traditionally a state function.272  Thus, unlike
Britain, America has the logistical and constitutional issue that po-
lice are and historically have been primarily decentralized, small,
and local operations.273  The United Kingdom’s parliamentary pro-
cess means that facilitating regulations in a centralized manner is
appropriate.274  The United States, on the other hand, would need
to consider a method permitting the states to develop regulations
individually,275 subject to judicial review for constitutionality.
Additionally, while it seems an elementary statement, it is
worth noting that the United States should not blanket adopt the
language of the British legislation.  Americans should not blindly
apply legislation possibly contrary to deeply held values, such as the
right to remain silent.276  Instead, the states should use the British
legislation as a framework that raises and addresses policing is-
sues.277  The United States should regulate police through policies
269. Cf. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1878 (discussing how
PACE and Codes of Practice were adopted after significant review and public
comment).
270. Id. at 1848–49.
271. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 58.
272. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
273. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1886 (noting that the me-
dian number of full-time sworn officers in local police departments in America is
only eight).
274. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 5.
275. Cf. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1886–89 (describing
scaling options for obtaining public comment on proposed regulations).
276. Cf. Chase, supra note 206, at 944.  Professor Chase analyzed whether the
United States should permit judges and juries to draw adverse inferences from the
accused’s invocation of the right to remain silent and found that it should. Id. at
949.
277. Berger, Legislating Confession Law, supra note 39, at 59.
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and procedures subject to American public comment and judicial
review.278
IV. CONCLUSION
Assessing issues of confession admissibility and police miscon-
duct in the larger context of the American criminal justice system
exposes how they are contributing pieces to a broken system.  Once
a crime occurs, police and prosecutors largely prioritize conviction
of someone over conviction of the right someone.279  The courts
themselves show a practice of prioritizing process over integrous
convictions.280
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
“the quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.”281  Policing
issues have been particularly prevalent in recent years.282  Legal
scholars have already mapped how legislatures can make a biparti-
san call for police regulation while minimizing concerns of political
heavyweights such as police departments.283  As police and civilian
interaction continues to make headlines and draw attention to po-
licing issues, legal professionals should use their positions of leader-
278. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1858.  Even though regula-
tory agencies are not required to be open to public input, policing methods “un-
equivocally have huge consequences for people, and thus should, as a normative
matter, be subject to . . . public notice and room for public participation.” Id.
279. See Kassin, Innocence, supra note 2, at 433 (discussing the way police will
close off an investigation after a confession, regardless of internal inconsistencies
to the confession, and the way prosecutors trust and defend their police investiga-
tors and defendant statements over DNA evidence).
280. Van Kessel, supra note 25, at 20.  Van Kessel concludes:
Consequently, the sole issue is whether the confession was coerced.  An
inquiry into whether it was true or false is irrelevant and forbidden:
“[T]he judge . . . is . . . duty-bound to ignore implications of reliability in
facts relevant to coercion and to shut from his mind any internal evidence
of authenticity that a confession itself may bear.”
Id. (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484–85 n.12 (1972)); see also Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897).
281. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting Walter V. Schae-
fer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
282. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1832; see, e.g., Andrea J.
Ritchie, How Some Cops Use the Badge to Commit Sex Crimes, WASH. POST (Jan.
12, 2018), https://wapo.st/2QLsTDq [https://perma.cc/C3KM-3RWL]; Chicago Po-
lice Misconduct Settlements Reach $45 Mln in 2018, DAILY HERALD (July 25, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2AbD5KV [https://perma.cc/6HQP-XWZN]; John Eligon, In St.
Louis, Protests Over Police Violence Disrupt Economy, and Win Attention, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yCxpt9 [https://perma.cc/YYG7-RR5L].
283. Albeit the scholars in this area are few and far between.  Friedman &
Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1834 n.31.
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ship to shape conversations and action by developing democratic
policing regulations.
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